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I.

T

WO GENERATIONS AGO, NEW DEALER AND FORMER PUERTO RICO GOVERNOR
Rexford Tugwell wrote a memoir about his time in Puerto Rico entitled
The Stricken Land.1 Although the title seemed inapt for many of the
years after the memoir was published—in the 1950s and 1960s, the vibrant econ‐
omy prompted talk of a “Puerto Rico miracle”2—it has begun to seem fitting again
more recently. Puerto Rico has experienced financial distress for over a decade,
and then‐governor Alejandro García Padilla declared the island unable to pay its
debts in 2015.3 In 2017, Puerto Rico was pummeled by two major hurricanes, only
days apart. A large percentage of Puerto Ricans spent months without electricity.
In the midst of this distress, after Puerto Rico’s default and before the hurri‐
canes, the U.S. Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act, known as P.R.O.M.E.S.A.4 P.R.O.M.E.S.A. responded to
Puerto Rico’s crisis by, among other things, creating an oversight board vested

* S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Mem‐
ber, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico. I am grateful to Michelle Wilde An‐
derson, Douglas Baird, Martin Bienenstock, Jaime El Koury, Kent Hiteshew, Kyle Rifkind, the editors
of Revista Jurídica, and the participants in the conference that gave rise to this symposium for helpful
comments and conversations, and to the University of Pennsylvania Law School for generous summer
funding. The views expressed in this Essay are personal and do not represent the oversight board or
any of its members.
1

REXFORD TUGWELL, THE STRICKEN LAND: THE STORY OF PUERTO RICO (1946).

2 Reinerio Hernández‐Márquez, The Puerto Rican Industrial Policy Debate of 1940‐1947: The Limits
of Dependent Colonial Growth, 3 BERKELEY PLAN. J. 76 (1986) (noting that economists called the econ‐
omy a “miracle”).
3 See, e.g., Michael Corkery, Puerto Rico Faces its Creditors in Early Debt Resolution Talks, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2015, at B1 (describing meeting with creditors two weeks after the announcement).
4 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (P.R.O.M.E.S.A.), Public Law
114‐187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2101 (2016)).
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with the authority to certify multi‐year fiscal plans for the island and its municipal
entities and providing a bankruptcy‐like framework for restructuring their debt.
Although P.R.O.M.E.S.A. was controversial from the beginning, its enactment
was an unlikely achievement. At a time of extreme political polarization in Wash‐
ington, Democrats and Republicans worked together to draft the legislation; it was
approved by large bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate, then
promptly signed into law by President Obama.
In August 2016, six others and I were appointed to three‐year terms as mem‐
bers of the initial oversight board.5 By this time, I had been studying, teaching and
writing about bankruptcy and financial distress for longer than I care to remem‐
ber, pursuing a calling that dates back to my second year of law school. I never
imagined that I would be asked to put my scholarly expertise to practical use in
any context, much less a crisis as urgent and important as Puerto Rico’s financial
distress.
This Essay, which I am honored to have been invited to write for Revista Ju‐
rídica, draws both on my scholarly and on my personal experience. I will begin in
a scholarly mode, by exploring the question of where P.R.O.M.E.S.A. came from.
P.R.O.M.E.S.A.’s core provisions are, I will argue, the product of two historical
patterns that have emerged in responses to the financial distress of public entities
in the United States. The first dates back to the 1970s crisis in New York City, while
the second is much more recent. If P.R.O.M.E.S.A. had been enacted prior to ei‐
ther of these developments, its provisions would have looked very different.
After exploring P.R.O.M.E.S.A.’s origins, I will venture a more personal ac‐
count of the decisions the oversight board has made during our first two years of
existence. Our first year of activity came before Hurricanes Irma and María, and
the second in the hurricanes’ awful aftermath. Like the recovery generally, we still
are far from having completed the task we were given. I will conclude by address‐
ing the criticisms we have faced—some from the left and others from the right—
and by offering my own view on how the success or failure of the Board should be
assessed.

I.

HOW WE GOT HERE

Legislative responses to financial distress in the United States are never cre‐
ated from scratch. They always come from somewhere—most often from the last
somewhat analogous crisis. Although America’s bankruptcy laws have been radi‐
cally revised on several occasions, each version has been based at least in part on
its predecessors.6 When Congress enacted new resolution rules for systemically

5 The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico is often referred to as the
F.O.M.B., its initials in English. I will use “oversight board” or “Board” to reduce the use of acronyms.
The other members of the board are José Carrión (chair), Andrew Biggs, Carlos García, Arthur Gonzá‐
lez, José González and Ana Matosantos.
6 I have discussed the origins and evolution of U.S. bankruptcy law at length elsewhere. DAVID A.
SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001).
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important financial institutions after the 2008 crisis, it borrowed liberally from the
existing bank resolution rules.7
Although P.R.O.M.E.S.A. follows this pattern, it is distinctive in bringing to‐
gether not just one, but two sets of historical developments: (1) the use of oversight
boards when public entities fall into financial distress, (2) and the more recent use
of municipal bankruptcy to restructure the debts of large cities.
A. The Rise of Oversight Boards
The watershed moment for oversight boards was New York City’s crisis in 1974
and 1975. In the midst of the crisis, state and local decision makers created a se‐
quence of three different crisis boards. A group of New York City financial leaders
responded first, forming the Financial Community Liaison group in 1974 with the
blessing of Mayor Abe Beam.8 In early 1975, the state legislature established the
Municipal Assistance Corporation (hereinafter, “M.A.C.”), which was authorized
to issue new bonds secured by New York’s sales tax and securities fees.9 The state
legislature then created yet another board, the Emergency Financial Control
Board (hereinafter, “E.F.C.B.”). The E.F.C.B. was given the authority to put a three
year budget in place for New York City, to approve or veto any new borrowing and
to oversee all of the city’s revenues.10
The E.F.C.B. was the board that proved effective. Although the Financial Com‐
munity Liaison Group included major figures in New York finance, the absence of
any formal authority rendered the group largely impotent.11 The shortcomings of
the M.A.C. were a reflection of the depth of the city’s financial crisis: investors
were reluctant to buy new New York City bonds, even with the promise of sales
tax and securities fees to assure repayment. The E.F.C.B., by contrast, had the
power to directly address New York City’s financial predicament. In the words of
Dick Ravitch, a veteran of this and subsequent New York financial crises, the
“elected officials who approved the city’s budgets [had become] far more con‐
cerned about allocating spending among various constituencies and interest
groups than they were with the question of whether the expenditures were
matched by recurring revenues.”12 The E.F.C.B. was not beholden to either the
public employee unions or the banks that underwrote New York City’s debt. The
7 See, e.g., Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts Inevitable?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 145 (2012) (noting that
“the OLA [the Orderly Liquidation Authority, which includes the resolution provisions of the Dodd‐
Frank Act] was modeled on the bank receivership provisions of the FDI Act”).
8

See, e.g., ROBERT W. BAILEY, THE CRISIS REGIME: THE MAC, THE EFCB, AND THE POLITICAL IMPACT
19‐20 (1984).

OF THE NEW YORK CITY FINANCIAL CRISIS

9

Id. at 23‐36.

10

Id. at 36‐43.

11 Bailey attributes its limitations to the absence of explicit authority and its “narrowness of polit‐
ical base.” Id. at 23.
12 RICHARD RAVITCH, SO MUCH TO DO: A FULL LIFE OF BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND CONFRONTING FISCAL
CRISES 79 (2014).
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E.F.C.B.’s independence from New York City’s interest group politics and the pow‐
erful tools it was given by the state legislature enabled it to begin to rein in the
city’s unsustainable spending.13
New York’s emergence from its crisis seems to have validated oversight boards
as a response to large‐scale municipal crises. When other major cities, including
Philadelphia, Washington, D.C. and Miami, fell into financial distress in the 1990s,
Congress and the states responded by putting oversight boards in place. The
Washington D.C. oversight board is especially relevant to Puerto Rico, because
both boards were created by Congress and because the Washington D.C. legisla‐
tion served as the template for Puerto Rico’s oversight board.14
D.C.’s Control Board was breathed into life by Congress in 1995, after Wash‐
ington had begun accruing substantial budget deficits.15 Treasury Secretary Robert
Rubin “was scared to death of [D.C. Mayor] Marion Barry having the blank check
drawn on the Treasury,” and encouraged the creation of the Control Board as an
alternative to an open‐ended federal bailout.16 Congress vested enormous author‐
ity in the new board. The Control Board could approve or disapprove District
budgets, had veto power over any borrowing by the District and could invalidate
any local legislation inconsistent with the District’s budget. The Control Board
legislation also created a Chief Financial Officer who had control of all of the Dis‐
trict’s revenues. During the six years of the Control Board’s existence—it ended in
2001, after D.C. had four consecutive balanced budgets—Congress expanded the
Board’s powers several times, authorizing the Control Board to veto even emer‐
gency District legislation and giving it management control over four city agencies
and nine major departments of D.C. government.17
Public perception of oversight boards typically has followed a similar trajec‐
tory. At the outset, they are denounced as undemocratic and are highly unpopular.
Shortly after the D.C. board was established, city workers protested by blocking
the Control Board’s office with garbage trucks during the morning rush hour.18
During the Board’s first meeting, protestors shouted “free D.C.” throughout the
meeting, which was brought to an end by a bomb threat.19 In Detroit, the appoint‐
ment of emergency manager Kevyn Orr was attacked as a takeover of Detroit by

13

See BAILEY, supra note 8, at 41‐43.

14 See, e.g., In re Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, 583 B.R. 626, 633‐34
(D.P.R. 2017) (comparing the powers of the Puerto Rico and D.C. boards). The Philadelphia board ap‐
parently was, in turn, the template for the D.C. board. See, e.g., DEBORAH I. KOBES, OUT OF CONTROL?
LOCAL DEMOCRACY FAILURE AND FISCAL CONTROL BOARDS 202 (2009) (unpublished dissertation, Mas‐
sachusetts Institute of Technology), available at https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/55132.
15 District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104‐8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995).
16

KOBES, supra note 14, at 195 (citations omitted).

17

For discussion, see id., at 206‐07.

18

Id. at 238.

19

Id. at 239.
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unsympathetic state officials. Orr faced repeated protests and needed twenty‐four
hour a day security.20
In each case, the initial hostility later gave way to acceptance and in some
cases enthusiastic endorsement. After resolutely opposing D.C.’s Control Board,
Mayor Marion Barry developed a working relationship with the Board and later
said that the Board had been essential to D.C.’s recovery.21 Anthony Williams, the
Chief Financial Officer put in place by the Board, was later elected mayor of the
District. Orr’s reputation underwent a similar transformation. He is now viewed
by many in Detroit and elsewhere as a hero.22
The initial reception of Puerto Rico’s oversight board was similar to its prede‐
cessors. As with Washington D.C. and Detroit, protests greeted the board’s early
public meetings, and the board was criticized as undemocratic and, in Puerto
Rico’s case, colonial.23 Unlike with its predecessors, there is not yet any evidence
of a shift in perceptions, either in opinion polls or in the press.
B. The Discovery of Chapter 9
The second stream that fed the P.R.O.M.E.S.A. legislation was the increasing
use of bankruptcy to resolve the municipal distress of substantial cities. As re‐
cently as a decade ago, bankruptcy was not part of the tool‐kit for addressing large
scale public financial distress. Now it is.
According to the conventional wisdom, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code—
the provisions governing municipal bankruptcy—was designed for sewer and wa‐
ter districts and the like, but could not handle the more complex problems of a
distressed city government.24 If a large city filed for bankruptcy, the thinking went,
the results would be catastrophic: services would be disrupted and the city would
lose its ability to borrow in the capital markets, perhaps forever. This made the
20 See, e.g., Eric D. Lawrence, Protestors decry Detroit’s emergency financial manager, USA
TODAY.COM (March 23, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/23/detroit‐
emergency‐manager‐protests/2013977/; Katie Rucke, Leaked Emails Show Detroit’s Emergency Man‐
ager Gets Luxury Treatment, MINT PRESS NEWS (June 22, 2013) (criticizing the elaborateness of Orr’s
security detail) https://staging.mintpressnews.com/leaked‐emails‐detroits‐unelected‐austerity‐man‐
ager‐lives‐lavishly/164102/.
21 See KOBES, supra note 14, at 231 (describing Barry’s growing cooperation with the board as
mayor).
22

See, e.g., NATHAN BOMEY, DETROIT RESURRECTED: TO BANKRUPTCY AND BACK (2016).

23 See, e.g., Luis J. Valentín Ortiz, Salsa, Rum and the Fiscal Board, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Oct. 6, 2016)
(describing protests of the first public meeting), http://caribbeanbusiness.com/salsa‐rum‐and‐the‐fis‐
cal‐board/. The criticism was not universal; in early opinion polls, most respondents in Puerto Rico
expressed support for the oversight board. See, e.g., PROMESA Board Meets to Discuss Governor’s Turn‐
around Plan, PUERTO RICO REPORT (Oct. 16 2016) (reporting that 69% of respondents in October 2016
El Nuevo Dia poll supported the Board, but also noting that many respondents indicated limited fa‐
miliarity with the Board), https://www.puertoricoreport.com/promesa‐board‐meets‐discuss‐gover‐
nors‐turnaround‐plan/#.WyUmyUgvzD4.
24 For a sophisticated recent version of the conventional wisdom, see Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt
Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399 (2012).
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threat of bankruptcy quite useful to spur lawmakers or interest groups into action.
Bankruptcy itself, however, was not viewed as useful at all.
Underfunded pensions epitomized the limitations of municipal bankruptcy.
The staggering burden of legacy pension obligations has become the principal
source of financial distress for many cities and states.25 Yet two insuperable obsta‐
cles seemed to rule out bankruptcy as a potential response. The first was political.
Because public employees are such a powerful and well‐connected interest group,
it was thought, a mayor or city council that tried to use bankruptcy to adjust the
city’s pensions would be committing political suicide. The political consequences
of filing for bankruptcy were simply too dire. The second obstacle was legal. Even
if the city’s elected officials were willing to file for bankruptcy, despite the political
impediments, many thought that a city could not legally alter its pension obliga‐
tions even in bankruptcy. After all, the reasoning went, state constitutions often
include provisions protecting pension obligations.
At the outset of the decade, both obstacles started to crumble. The erosion
began in a small Rhode Island town called Central Falls. In 2011, Central Falls was
in deep financial distress. It was clear both that Central Falls had no other choice
than to file for bankruptcy and that the town would need to restructure its pension
commitments, which were seriously underfunded and by far the town’s largest
financial obligation. Central Falls did file for bankruptcy and it made major ad‐
justments to its pension obligations, cutting them roughly in half.26 The state of
Rhode Island later passed legislation replacing a portion of the lost benefits, thus
reducing the hardship for Central Falls’ pension beneficiaries, but the pensions
were significantly restructured.
The Central Falls bankruptcy filing signaled that the political barriers to ad‐
justing pensions in bankruptcy were not insurmountable if a city had no other
choice. Central Falls did not, however, address the second, legal obstacle to re‐
structuring pensions in bankruptcy. Central Falls’ pension beneficiaries ultimately
agreed to the restructuring of their pensions. As a result, the bankruptcy judge did
not need to rule on the question whether pensions can be restructured if one or
more pension beneficiaries object. The legal barrier was still in place.
Then came Detroit. When Detroit filed for bankruptcy in 2013, it was clear
that the Motor City needed to restructure all of its major debt obligations, includ‐
ing its pensions. Shortly after his appointment and before filing for bankruptcy,
Kevyn Orr, Detroit’s Emergency Manager, estimated that Detroit’s pensions were
underfunded by $3.5 billion.27 He signaled that Detroit’s pension obligations

25 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE (Jan. 2014), available at
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/state_budget_crisis_task_force.pdf
(analyzing pension crisis and other state budget problems).
26 See, e.g., Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island Gains Approval, N.Y. TIMES, (Sep.
7, 2012), at A21.
27 See, e.g., Randy Kennedy et al., Foundations Aim to Save Pensions in Detroit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/us/300‐million‐pledged‐to‐save‐detroits‐art‐col‐
lection.html.
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would need to be adjusted both for existing and for new employees. Detroit’s pub‐
lic employee unions challenged Detroit’s bankruptcy filing, insisting that the in‐
tended pension restructuring was illegal and some of Detroit’s pension beneficiar‐
ies later voted against Detroit’s proposed plan of adjustment. The bankruptcy
judge was directly confronted with the legal question whether the pensions could
be adjusted. In his ruling declaring Detroit eligible for bankruptcy, the Detroit
bankruptcy judge concluded the pensions could indeed be restructured, notwith‐
standing Michigan’s constitutional protections.28
After the Detroit ruling, the judge in the bankruptcy of Stockton, California
reached the same conclusion. Unlike Detroit, however, Stockton ultimately de‐
cided not to restructure the pensions.29 As of now, then, two bankruptcy judges
have concluded—one directly, one in dicta—that public entities can restructure
their pension obligations in bankruptcy. Because the appellate courts have not yet
addressed this question, it is worth asking whether the Detroit and Stockton
judges were right. In my view, they were.
It is important to begin by pointing out that only the unfunded portion of the
pensions is generally at issue. If a city promised its pension beneficiaries $1000,
and it had set aside $700 to pay the obligations, the beneficiaries would have a
constitutionally protected property right to the $700 that had been set aside. Only
the unfunded portion—$300 in this example—could be adjusted.
With Detroit, the most obvious argument that the city could not restructure
even the unfunded portion of its pensions was based on a 1963 amendment to the
Michigan constitution. According to the amendment, “[t]he accrued pension ben‐
efits of each pension plan . . . shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall
not be diminished or impaired.”30 This provision seemed to forbid adjustments, at
least of accrued benefits. But the amendment was not designed with restructuring
in mind. The drafters were trying to address a different problem—a problem with
the legal status of pension promises.31 Pension promises have traditionally been
treated as “gratuities” for legal purposes, which meant that the city or state could
withdraw the promised benefit at any time if it changed its mind. The drafters of
the constitutional amendment sought to put pensions on a firmer legal footing by
ensuring they had the same contractual status as other obligations. They were not
attempting to determine whether pension obligations could be restructured if a
city was incapable of paying them.

28 In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 150‐54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). The bankruptcy judge
confirmed this holding in his opinion approving Detroit’s plan of adjustment. In re City of Detroit,
Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 181 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
29

Stockton did significantly restructure its employees’ healthcare benefits.

30

MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.

31 For further discussion, see David Skeel, The Meaning of Detroit, NAT’L AFFAIRS 3, 10 (Winter
2015); David A. Skeel Jr., Can Pensions be Restructured in (Detroit’s) Municipal Bankruptcy 5‐6 (Feder‐
alist Society White Paper, Oct. 2013).
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Even if Michigan’s constitutional provision were designed to prevent a re‐
structuring, it would be overridden by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Consti‐
tution.32 Because bankruptcy law is federal, it prevails over a conflicting state law.
Federal law prevails even over a state constitutional provision.
The second argument is an attack not just on pension restructuring, but on
municipal bankruptcy as a whole. According to this argument, municipal bank‐
ruptcy violates one or both of two provisions in the U.S. Constitution.33 It either
encroaches on state sovereignty, thus violating the Tenth Amendment, or violates
the Contracts Clause, which prohibits a state from interfering with existing con‐
tracts.34 Because the Contracts Clause only prevents states from impairing con‐
tracts, not Congress, this objection characterizes Congress as using its bankruptcy
authority to aid and abet an impairment of contracts by states and their munici‐
palities.
In my view, these are not silly arguments. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down the first municipal bankruptcy law on these grounds in 1936,35 before
upholding a similar law two years later.36 But the municipal bankruptcy law pro‐
tects states’ sovereignty by, among other things, requiring the state to consent to
a municipality’s bankruptcy filing, permitting only voluntary filings and preclud‐
ing the court from interfering with political or governmental powers. Contrary to
the Contracts Clause argument, the power to restructure a municipality’s obliga‐
tions emanates from Congress, not the state. In view of these facts, the Detroit
judge seems right to have concluded that municipal bankruptcy is fully constitu‐
tional.
A final objection is based on a provision of Chapter 9 itself. A bankruptcy court
is prohibited from approving a city’s restructuring plan if the plan would require
the city to take steps that are “prohibited by law.”37 Since Michigan law prohibits
the impairment of accrued pension benefits, the argument goes, a plan of adjust‐
ment that restructured pensions would be invalid because pension adjustments
are prohibited by law. Construing the provision in this way would set Chapter 9
at war with itself. All—or nearly all—of the contracts that a municipality restruc‐
tures in bankruptcy are contracts the municipality could not restructure outside
of bankruptcy, due to the Contracts Clause in the U.S. and state constitutions. The
“prohibited by law” provision cannot have been designed to render municipal

32

Id. U.S. CONST. art VI.

33

See, e.g., Skeel, The Meaning of Detroit, supra note 31, at 11.

34

Id. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.

35

Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).

36

United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).

37

11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4) (2012).
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bankruptcy useless and it has not be construed in this way.38 The Detroit court
held that the provision applies to a municipality’s obligations after they have been
restructured, not to the restructuring itself.39 Chapter 9 permits a restructuring,
but once the municipality emerges from bankruptcy it cannot be violating the law.
Much as with pension obligations, the recent municipal bankruptcy cases also
open up space to significantly restructure a distressed city’s bond debt. Prior to
Detroit, many in the municipal bond markets believed that general obligation
bonds—that is, bonds supported by the “full faith and credit” of the city that is‐
sued them—could not be restructured in bankruptcy.40 According to this logic,
revenue bonds are partially protected in bankruptcy, because their repayment is
secured to the extent of the revenue stream pledged to them; general obligation
bonds are entirely protected because of the generally held view that a city would
be obligated to raise revenues or cut expenses to the extent necessary to service
its debts.41 The Detroit case revealed the fallacy in this reasoning. If a general ob‐
ligation bond is not collateralized in any way, as usually is the case, it is simply an
unsecured obligation. It is subject to restructuring, just as the unsecured obliga‐
tions of a corporation are in Chapter 11.
Prior to the enactment of P.R.O.M.E.S.A., oversight boards had been used to
address the distress of significant cities for more than forty years. The use of mu‐
nicipal bankruptcy was far more recent, but it was rapidly coming of age. Each of
these trends figured prominently in the provisions Congress included in
P.R.O.M.E.S.A.

II. P.R.O.M.E.S.A. A N D T H E O V E R S I G H T B O A R D S O F A R
P.R.O.M.E.S.A. breathed the oversight board into being and gave us two major
sources of authority: the power to certify fiscal plans for Puerto Rico and its mu‐
nicipal entities, and the power to restructure Puerto Rico’s debt. Not coinci‐
dentally, each source of authority corresponds to one of the historical trends. Yet
each also has features that are unique to P.R.O.M.E.S.A. After describing the two
pillars of the oversight board’s mandate, I will briefly chronicle our efforts before
and after Puerto Rico was ravaged by Hurricanes Irma and Maria in September
2017.

38 See In re Sanitary & Improv. Dist. #7, 98 B.R. 970, 974 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (stating that “[t]o
create a federal statute based upon the theory that federal intervention was necessary to permit ad‐
justment of a municipality’s debts and then to prohibit the municipality from adjusting such debts is
not, to the point of view of this Court, a logical or necessary result.”)
39

In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147, 211‐12 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).

40 For discussion of this misperception and illustrative citations, see David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a
Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 684‐85.
41

Id.
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A. P.R.O.M.E.S.A.’s Two Pillars: Fiscal Plans and Restructuring
The touchstone for the oversight board’s budgetary authority is the require‐
ment that we certify fiscal plans for Puerto Rico and any “covered” municipal en‐
tities —that is, entities the board has designated as subject to P.R.O.M.E.S.A.’s
requirements.42 Under P.R.O.M.E.S.A., each fiscal plan must cover at least the next
five years. It also must seek to “restore fiscal responsibility and access to the capital
markets,” and satisfy a list of fourteen different requirements, from “provid[ing]
for estimates of revenues and expenditures” to “respect[ing] the relative lawful
priorities or lawful liens.”43
P.R.O.M.E.S.A. also specifies the process by which the fiscal plan is produced.
The Governor of Puerto Rico submits a proposed fiscal plan, on a schedule deter‐
mined by the oversight board.44 The oversight board determines whether the plan
satisfies the requirements of P.R.O.M.E.S.A. If it does not, the Board issues a notice
of violation to the Governor.45 The Governor then submits a revised fiscal plan to
the Board.46 After this iterative process, the Board either certifies the Governor’s
fiscal plan, certifies a joint Governor‐Board plan, or—if the plan is not
P.R.O.M.E.S.A.‐compliant—it proceeds to certify its own fiscal plan.47
The fiscal plan is an extraordinarily important document. It is not immuta‐
ble—it can be revised and recertified to reflect changed circumstances—but every
annual budget is required to conform to the fiscal plan currently in effect.48 If it
does not, the Board is instructed to issue a notice of violation; if the Governor does
not correct the deficiency the Board can (and must) develop its own “revised com‐
pliant budget.”49 The Board also is given the authority to prevent enforcement of
proposed contracts or regulations that are inconsistent the fiscal plan.50 Moreover,
the federal district court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over any liti‐
gant’s challenges to certified fiscal plans or budgets.51

42 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2141(a) (2016)
(providing for fiscal plans); id. § 2141(b) (requirements apply to “territorial government or covered ter‐
ritorial instrumentality.”)
43

Id. § 2141(b)(1).

44 Id. § 2141(a) (“the Oversight Board shall deliver a notice to the Governor providing a schedule
for the . . . Fiscal Plans.”)
45

Id. § 2141(c)(3)(B)(i) (notice of violation).

46

Id. § 2141(d)(1) (instructing Governor to submit revised plan).

47 Id. § 2141(e)(1) (approval of Governor’s plan); id. § 2141(e)(2) (oversight board’s plan); id. § 2141(e)
(joint plan).
48 Id. § 2142(c)(1) (stating that “the Oversight Board shall determine in its sole discretion whether
each proposed Budget is compliant with the applicable Fiscal Plan.”)
49

Id. § 2142(d)(1)(B) (notice of violation); id. § 2142(e)(3) (Board’s own budget).

50 The Board also has oversight authority over any new issuance of debt. This authority applies
whether or not a fiscal plan is in place.
51

48 U.S.C. § 2126(e).
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A principal template for P.R.O.M.E.S.A.’s fiscal provisions was the D.C. Con‐
trol Board statute from the 1990s.52 The iterative fiscal plan process, and the re‐
quirement of a multi‐year fiscal plan, echo the D.C. precedent.53 In some respects,
the Puerto Rico oversight board has even more authority than the D.C. board;54
but in several respects, the Puerto Rico Board’s authority is not as broad as the
D.C. Board. The D.C. statute provided for the appointment of a new Chief Finan‐
cial Officer who had authority over the District’s revenues and answered primarily
to the Control Board.55 As a result of subsequent legislation, the D.C. board also
had control over much of the D.C. government.56 Since we do not have these ad‐
ditional powers, the fiscal plan is even more central to the Puerto Rico board’s
authority than it was in Washington, D.C.57
The second major source of authority is the power to initiate a restructuring
on behalf of Puerto Rico or one of its municipal entities. P.R.O.M.E.S.A. provides
two separate restructuring frameworks, one known as Title VI and the other as
Title III—based, in each case, on the part of P.R.O.M.E.S.A. where the provisions
appear.58 Title VI, the simpler option, is similar to the collective action provisions
that are used to restructure sovereign debt.59 It applies only to bonds, as very
broadly defined,60 and permits the bonds to be restructured if sufficient majorities
of each type of bonds vote in favor. Title VI is purely consensual—there is no
mechanism for requiring a class of bonds to accept a restructuring if the class votes
no—and it does not have many of the features that bankruptcy or a bankruptcy‐
like process includes, such as the automatic stay.

52 District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104‐8, § 201, 109 Stat. 97 (1995) (establishing financial plan requirements); Id. § 202 (defining pro‐
cess for submission and approval of financial plans and budgets).
53 There were a variety of differences; the District of Columbia plan (called a “financial plan”) was
for the current year and the next three years, rather than a minimum of five years as with
P.R.O.M.E.S.A., and it was subject to a somewhat different list of requirements.
54 Perhaps most importantly, P.R.O.M.E.S.A. authorizes the Board to initiate bankruptcy‐like re‐
structuring proceedings, as discussed below. P.R.O.M.E.S.A. also repeatedly gives authority to the
oversight board in its “sole discretion.” See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 2141(c)(3) (fiscal plan certification decisions
are in the Board’s sole discretion).
55 Pub. L. No. 104‐8, § 302, 109 Stat. 97. The Chief Financial Officer who was appointed, Anthony
Williams, proved so successful that he was later elected mayor.
56 See District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104‐8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995).
57 In re Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, 583 B.R. 626, 633‐34 (D.P.R.
2017).
58 Title VI is sections 601‐602 of P.R.O.M.E.S.A., and Title III is sections 301‐317 of P.R.O.M.E.S.A.
Pub. L. No. 114‐187, §§ 301‐317, 601‐602, 130 Stat. 549 (2016). U.S. bankruptcy law uses a similar labeling
strategy. Chapter 9—the municipal bankruptcy chapter—consists of sections 901‐946. United States
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 901‐946. Chapter 11—reorganization—consists of sections 1101‐1174 of 11
U.S.C. §§ 1101‐1174.
59

48 U.S.C. §§ 2231‐2232.

60

Id. § 2104(2) (defining “Bond”).
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Title III is very similar to bankruptcy.61 If the drafters had the D.C. Control
Board statute in front of them as they designed P.R.O.M.E.S.A.’s fiscal plan provi‐
sions, their eyes were on Chapter 9 when they constructed Title III. As with Chap‐
ter 9, Title III provides only for voluntary filings; creditors cannot file an involun‐
tary case.62 In each context, an automatic stay prohibiting creditors from contin‐
uing to pursue non‐bankruptcy collection efforts goes into effect as soon as the
debtor files.63 The debtor then negotiates with its creditors over the terms of a plan
of adjustment. After the plan and a disclosure statement are approved, the plan is
submitted to each class of creditors for a vote.64 The plan can be approved con‐
sensually, if each class of creditors vote yes, or non‐consensually, if one or more
classes vote no and the requirements for a nonconsensual plan are satisfied.65
Title III’s most important innovation is the fact that it covers not just Puerto
Rico municipalities, but Puerto Rico itself. Unlike Chapter 9, which applies to mu‐
nicipal entities within a state but not to the state, Title III includes the larger en‐
tity, Puerto Rico.66 The expanded scope appears to reflect a conclusion by the
drafters that restructuring the Puerto Rico’s municipal debt might not be suffi‐
cient to address Puerto Rico’s financial distress.
The inclusion of Puerto Rico itself within the ambit of Title III may explain,
or partially explain, the puzzling absence of any reference to “bankruptcy” in
P.R.O.M.E.S.A.67 By avoiding the term “bankruptcy,” and relying on its authority
under the Territories Clause of the Constitution, rather than the Bankruptcy
Clause, lawmakers may have sought to reassure state bankruptcy critics that
P.R.O.M.E.S.A. is not intended to lay a foundation for state bankruptcy. Title III is
unique to Puerto Rico and potentially other U.S. territories.
Whatever the logic, P.R.O.M.E.S.A.’s restructuring provisions are powerful
tools for addressing Puerto Rico’s financial distress. The oversight board adminis‐
ters Title VI proceedings and is the one that files a Title III case, serves as the
representative of the debtor, and files the plan of adjustment. Title III is distinct
from Chapter 9 in that imposes a confirmation standard that requires that any
61

Id. §§ 2161‐2177.

62 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 301 of the Bankruptcy Code (voluntary filings) but
not 11 U.S.C. § 303 (involuntary filings)); 48 U.S.C. § 2164(a) (commencement of voluntary case).
63 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code); 48 U.S.C. § 2161 (incor‐
porating 11 U.S.C. § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code)).
64 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1125 and parts of 11 U.S.C. § 1126, which govern disclo‐
sure statements and voting in Chapter 11); 48 U.S.C. § 2161 (same)).
65 11 U.S.C. 901(a) (incorporating parts of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) and (b), which govern consensual and
nonconsensual reorganization in Chapter 11); 48 U.S.C. § 2161 (same)).
66 48 U.S.C. § 2162(1)(A) (permitting filing by “a territory that . . . has had an Oversight Board
established for it.”).
67 On the other hand, the omission also reflects a historical pattern: Congress has long used dis‐
tinct labels for the restructuring of a public entity’s debt. Chapter 9 is called “Adjustment of Debts of
a Municipality,” and creditor votes on a plan of adjustment, rather than a reorganization plan as in
corporate bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012) (providing for the filing of “a plan for the adjustment of
the debtor’s debts.”)
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plan of adjustment conform to the then certified Fiscal Plan. Thus, the board’s
powers to set forth Puerto Rico’s future fiscal path are inextricably linked to, and
designed to be consistent with, the debt restructuring framework.
B. Act One: Pre‐Maria
When the seven members of the oversight board were appointed on August
31, 2016, we were on our own. We had no staff or advisors. I knew one of the other
board members, and had once met another, but did not know the others.68 Most
of the other board members were in a similar position. The seven of us were on
the phone constantly, dealing with matters large and small. We selected a chair‐
man, José Carrión, and began our search for advisors, hiring a strategic consultant
and New York and Puerto Rico law firms in the first few months.
The overriding objective of the first year was to certify fiscal plans for the
Commonwealth, Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (hereinafter, “P.R.E.P.A.”),
the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (hereinafter, “P.R.A.S.A.”), the
Government Development Bank, the University of Puerto Rico and several other
municipal entities. Our mantra was “once and done.” We referred to this principle
repeatedly, both in private conversations and public meetings. “Once and done”
meant we would avoid half measures that would require that additional adjust‐
ments be made in the future. We would insist on a fiscal plan and debt restruc‐
turing that did everything necessary to restore fiscal balance and access to capital
markets, as P.R.O.M.E.S.A. requires, and would create the conditions for eco‐
nomic growth.
The most obvious obstacle, both for then‐governor Alejandro García Padilla
and for the oversight board, was that no one really knew what Puerto Rico’s reve‐
nues and expenditures were. The Puerto Rico Legislature passed a balanced
budget each year, but the budget relied on accounting gimmicks such as delayed
payments to vendors, under‐funding of pension contributions, borrowing to fund
current expenses, and overestimation of expected revenues. The most recent au‐
dited financial statements dated back to fiscal year 2014.69
Much of the oversight board’s energy in late 2016 and early 2017 was devoted
to establishing a credible “baseline scenario” of revenues and expenses. Based ini‐
tially on the information received from the García Padilla administration, our ad‐
visors would calculate as precisely as they could the likely revenues and expenses
for the ten year period to be covered in the fiscal plan. To determine the baseline
scenario, we would consider only revenues that could be expected to materialize
and which did not require new legislative action from Congress.
Our conclusion that speculative revenues should not be included created an
impasse with governor García Padilla. A key issue was federal funding for Puerto

68

I knew Judge Arthur González from bankruptcy circles and had met Andrew Biggs.

69 Melba Acosta Febos, La reestructuración de la deuda como respuesta a la crisis fiscal de Puerto
Rico y la recuperación luego del huracan María, 87 REV. JUR. UPR 821 (2018).
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Rico’s Medicaid and Medicare expenses. Puerto Rico receives considerably less re‐
imbursement for these expenses than states do; in 2011, Congress gave Puerto Rico
$6.4 billion in additional funding for fiscal years 2011‐2019 to make up for some of
the difference. The extra funds were rapidly being used up, and were expected to
zero out as early as the first quarter of fiscal year 2018 (Summer 2017).70 We con‐
cluded that it was not appropriate to assume that Congress would provide addi‐
tional funding, since it was not clear Congress would. Because governor García
Padilla’s proposed fiscal plan assumed major new healthcare funding and other
uncertain funding, we issued a notice of violation.71
In January, 2017, governor Rosselló assumed office, after having won the elec‐
tion in November. On January 18, 2017, we sent governor Rosselló a letter outlining
the baseline scenario we had developed and the size of the adjustments that we
believed needed to be made to bring Puerto Rico’s finances into fiscal balance.72
Under the baseline scenario—before taking measures to increase revenues and
decrease expenses—we projected annual deficits of $7 billion per year for the ten
years of the plan.73 To close the gap, we concluded that the Puerto Rico’s govern‐
ment would need to increase tax revenues by $1.5 billion annually by fiscal year
2019 and undertake significant structural and fiscal reforms, including steps to
right‐size the government (savings of $1.5 billion annually by fiscal year 2019) and
to reduce higher education, healthcare and pension costs.74
Given the magnitude of the gap, and the breadth of the sacrifice that would
be required under the “once and done” approach, it seemed unlikely that we and
governor Rosselló’s administration would reach agreement over the terms of a
certifiable fiscal plan. But we did. After a flurry of last minute negotiations that
culminated the night before the public meeting at which the fiscal plan would be
certified, we agreed to certify a document consisting of the Governor’s fiscal plan,
modified by two amendments drafted by the oversight board.75

70 See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ASPE DATA POINT, NEARLY 900,000 PUERTO RICANS
MAY LOSE HEALTH COVERAGE WHEN MEDICAID FUNDS RUN OUT (Jan. 12, 2017), available at
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/255461/PuertoRicoEnrollment_DataPoint.pdf.
71 Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chair, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto
Rico, to Alejandro García Padilla, Governor of Puerto Rico (Nov. 23, 2016). The proposed fiscal plan
also assumed that a key portion of Puerto Rico’s tax revenues—so called Act 154 revenues—would not
decline despite significant risk that they would.
72 Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chair, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto
Rico, to Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of Puerto Rico (Jan. 18, 2017) [hereinafter, “January 18,
2017 F.O.M.B. letter.”]
73

Id. at 1.

74

Id. at 4‐6.

75 See Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Minutes of Fifth Meeting of the
Board (Mar. 13, 2017). Fiscal plans for the Government Development Bank (“G.D.B.”), the Puerto Rico
Highways & Transportation Authority (“H.T.A.”), the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority
(“P.R.A.S.A.”) and the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“P.R.E.P.A.”) were certified at the Board’s
seventh meeting the following month. See Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico,
Minutes of Seventh Meeting of the Board (April 28, 2017).
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During this same period of time, we also were negotiating with creditors of,
among others, the Commonwealth and P.R.E.P.A., over the terms of potential re‐
structuring. As of the moment of its enactment, P.R.O.M.E.S.A. provided a six
month stay on creditor litigation and other creditor efforts to collect what they
are owed, and authorized us to extend the stay for another seventy‐five days.76 The
stay was essential, preventing the complete chaos that would have ensued if cred‐
itor collection activity had not been restrained. But the stay came to an end on
May 1, 2017. The only way to retain the stay would be to file Title III petitions.
On May 2, governor Rosselló sent letters to the oversight board asking us to
file a Title III case for the Commonwealth and several other entities. 77 Faced with
the prospect of dozens of creditor lawsuits, we filed for Title III the next day.
P.R.E.P.A. was not one of the early Title III filings. Prior to the enactment of
P.R.O.M.E.S.A., P.R.E.P.A. and many of its creditors had negotiated the terms of a
potential Restructuring Support Agreement (hereinafter, “R.S.A.”). Under the pro‐
posed R.S.A., as amended multiple times by the creditors and P.R.E.P.A. before
the Board voted on it, some of P.R.E.P.A.’s bond creditors would agree to a fifteen
percent restructuring of their debt, and the debt would essentially be converted
into fully secured claims supported by a “transition charge” on electricity reve‐
nues. If we initiated a Title VI proceeding for the R.S.A., P.R.O.M.E.S.A. provided
a streamlined process for its approval. The seven of us wrestled for weeks over the
question whether to approve the R.S.A. and to initiate Title VI. Although the
R.S.A. clearly would be very generous to creditors, and had been negotiated at a
time when P.R.E.P.A. did not have access to bankruptcy or other restructuring
provisions, some board members thought it would be manageable and would help
stabilize the troubled, unreliable utility; they feared that P.R.E.P.A. could not sur‐
vive a privatization or other transformative transaction. Others believed that
transformation was essential and that the terms of the R.S.A. would make trans‐
formation impossible. In the end, the board voted to reject the R.S.A. by a 4‐3
vote.78 The board filed a Title III case for P.R.E.P.A. on July 2, 2017.
As the first anniversary of our appointment arrived, we had made extensive
use of the tools provided by P.R.O.M.E.S.A. We also had been sharply criticized
by nearly everyone. Many Puerto Ricans and economists such as Nobel Prize win‐
ner Joseph Stiglitz argued that our economic projections were far too optimistic,

76 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2194(d)(1)(B)
(2016).
77 Letter from Ricardo Rosselló Nevares, Governor, to José B. Carrión III, Chair, Financial Oversight
and Management Board for Puerto Rico (May 2 2017). Governor Rosselló pointed out, among other
things, that “good‐faith efforts to reach a consensual restructuring . . . [had] not demonstrated suffi‐
cient progress so as to achieve a sustainable level of debt under the Fiscal Plan.” Id.
78 The P.R.E.P.A. vote was the Board’s first non‐unanimous vote. The four of us who voted not to
initiate a Title VI process for P.R.E.P.A. wrote a column explaining our reasoning. Andrew Biggs, Ar‐
thur J. González, Ana J. Matosantos & David Skeel, Privatize Puerto Rico’s Power, WALL ST. J. (June 29,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/privatize‐puerto‐ricos‐power‐1498776904.
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and that the cuts called for in Puerto Rico’s fiscal plan would magnify the eco‐
nomic crisis in Puerto Rico, leading to a deep depression. 79 Creditors criticized
the fiscal plan in the opposite terms. They insisted that the economic assumptions
of the fiscal plan were unduly pessimistic and that the fiscal plan provided too
little money for repayment of creditors. 80
No one enjoys being criticized, but we all understood this to be part of our
job. The role of an oversight board is to make decisions that are difficult for others
to make—and where necessary, to be the bad guy. We assumed the next step
would be to make sure the fiscal plan was fully implemented, to see if the projec‐
tions proved to be accurate (and if not, to adjust the fiscal plan) and to develop
the terms of plans of adjustment in the Title III cases.
Then the hurricanes hit.
C. Act Two: Post‐Maria
Those of us who were not on island when Hurricane Maria pummeled Puerto
Rico probably cannot fully understand what it was like. A friend of mine says it
sounded like an airplane roaring to life, over and over, for twelve hours. The entire
island lost power and a large percentage of Puerto Ricans would be without power
for months (some still are). A new report estimates that the hurricanes may have
caused more than 4000 deaths, many because access to medical treatment was cut
off.81
One of the first actions the oversight board took was to withdraw a motion
we had filed in the Title III case in a dispute over furloughs with governor Ros‐
selló.82 One of the amendments to the fiscal plan required the Governor to imple‐
ment furloughs (essentially, salary reductions) for public employees if he was not
able to achieve sufficient savings through other governmental reforms. When the
savings proved insufficient, the Governor had taken the position that the furlough
amendment was a recommendation, not a requirement, and he refused to imple‐
ment it. Given the island‐wide suffering caused by the hurricanes, furloughs no
longer made sense and we withdrew our motion to compel implementation.

79 See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz & Martin Guzman, From Bad to Worse for Puerto Rico, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Feb. 28, 2017) (criticizing the projections used for the initial fiscal plan), https://www.pro‐
ject‐syndicate.org/commentary/puerto‐rico‐debt‐plan‐deep‐depression‐by‐joseph‐e‐‐stiglitz‐and‐
martin‐guzman‐2017‐02?barrier=accesspaylog.
80 See, e.g., Assured Guaranty Corp. et al. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al., Adv. Proc. No.
17‐125‐LTS (2017 D.P.R.) (In re Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico as repre‐
sentative of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) (alleging that the fiscal plan was illegal and unconsti‐
tutional).
81 Nishant Kishore et al., Mortality in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria, NEW ENG. J. MED. (May
29, 2018), available at https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1803972.
82 See, e.g., Alex Wolf, Puerto Rico Board Withdraws Bid to Force Furloughs, LAW360 (Oct. 4, 2017),
available at https://www.law360.com/articles/971463/puerto‐rico‐board‐withdraws‐bid‐to‐force‐fur‐
loughs.

878

REVISTA JURÍDICA UPR

Vol. 87

We also offered our support to governor Rosselló as he met with lawmakers
in Washington to ask for generous disaster relief from Congress. Governor Ros‐
selló has made numerous visits to Washington to inform lawmakers of the extent
of the destruction caused by the hurricanes and the progress of the recovery.
One issue on which we found ourselves in conflict with the Rosselló admin‐
istration was P.R.E.P.A. Even before the hurricane, P.R.E.P.A. was fragile and
highly unreliable. The people of Puerto Rico faced frequent, unpredictable black‐
outs. We concluded that P.R.E.P.A.’s governance could be streamlined and im‐
proved, and its response to the hurricane enhanced, if a chief transformation of‐
ficer (hereinafter, “C.T.O.”) were put in place to centralize internal decision mak‐
ing and to serve as a focal point for the desperately needed transformation of
P.R.E.P.A. We filed a motion in the Title III case asking for approval of our C.T.O.,
P.R.E.P.A. and the Governor opposed the motion.83 They acknowledged that
P.R.O.M.E.S.A. gave us extensive authority, but argued we did not have the power
to “take over” the electricity company. Much to our disappointment, Judge Swain
agreed with P.R.E.P.A. and the government. She pointed out that our request for
a C.T.O. was not based on the fiscal plan, or on the government’s violation of a
fiscal plan or budget, and emphasized that the Board’s powers are not unlimited.84
She admonished the Board and the government to work together.
As we and governor Rosselló’s administration began work on new fiscal
plans—fiscal plan 2.0, we called them—the oversight board had significantly more
capacity than we had a year earlier. In Spring 2017, before the hurricanes, we had
hired an executive director, Natalie Jaresko. Earlier this decade, as Minister of Fi‐
nance of Ukraine, Natalie had managed the successful restructuring of Ukraine’s
debt, and had also run a private equity fund in Ukraine. In addition to the excel‐
lent staff we already had, Natalie hired new staff, significantly enhancing our in‐
ternal expertise. We also still had the outside advisors we had depended on in the
initial fiscal plan and Title III process. The oversight board was no longer a startup.
A major new complexity was incorporating the massive amount of anticipated
disaster relief from the federal government into the new fiscal plan. Congress has
passed several disaster relief bills, each of which included funding for Puerto Rico,
and it is possible that more relief will be forthcoming.85 It is difficult to determine
precisely how much aid Puerto Rico will receive, because most of the funds are
distributed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other agencies on

83

URGENT MOTION OF FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO FOR ENTRY
In re Finan‐
cial and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Docket No. 361, Case No. 17‐04‐780 (D.P.R) (Oct. 26, 2017);
OPPOSITION OF AAFAF, ON BEHALF OF GOVERNOR RICARDO ROSSELLÓ, TO THE OVERSIGHT BOARD’S
URGENT MOTION FOR AN ORDER CONFIRMING APPOINTMENT OF A CHIEF TRANSFORMATION OFFICER, In re
Financial and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Docket No. 381, Case No. 17‐04‐780 (D.P.R. (Nov.
13, 2017).
OF ORDER CONFIRMING APPOINTMENT AND AUTHORITY OF CHIEF TRANSFORMATION OFFICER,

84

In re Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, 583 B.R. 626 (D.P.R. 2017).

85 See, e.g., Patricia Mazzei, What Puerto Rico Is, and Isn’t Getting in Disaster Relief, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2018), at A20 (describing the disaster relief aid approved by Congress since September, 2017).
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a discretionary basis. The number we used in the fiscal plan—$54.5 billion—re‐
flected the amount of aid Puerto Rico is likely to receive under existing legisla‐
tion.86
Another major complication was migration from the island. Even before the
hurricanes, Puerto Rico’s population was declining. The destruction caused by the
hurricanes, and the months of delay before electricity was finally restored in many
areas, left many Puerto Ricans feeling they needed to leave the island. Departure
is as simple as a flight to Miami or New York, especially for those who have family
or friends on the mainland. A massive migration would sharply reduce Puerto
Rico’s tax revenues in the coming years; an exodus of medical professionals could
magnify Puerto Rico’s healthcare crisis. These possibilities and other uncertainties
needed to be taken into account in the revised fiscal plan.87
In the midst of discussions on the new fiscal plans, governor Rosselló an‐
nounced that he intended to transform P.R.E.P.A. through a privatization pro‐
cess.88 The Governor proposed that an outside manager be brought in to run
P.R.E.P.A.’s transmission and distribution system pursuant to a long term con‐
tract, and to privatize much or all of P.R.E.P.A.’s generation. P.R.E.P.A. currently
relies heavily on oil to generate electricity; privatization would significantly
change the generation mix, to rely much more on renewable sources of electricity
such as solar energy. We strongly endorsed the Governor’s privatization plan. Af‐
fordable, reliable electricity is essential both to the future of P.R.E.P.A. itself and
to creating the economic growth Puerto Rico needs. Like the Governor, we believe
some form of privatization is the best way to achieve it.
We worked closely with the Governor and his administration on the new fiscal
plans, meeting in person on multiple occasions. In the end, we were unable to
reach complete agreement on the Puerto Rico or P.R.E.P.A. fiscal plans, due to our
belief that significant labor reform and an adjustment to Puerto Rico’s pensions
are essential to achieving fiscal balance and future economic growth, and to the
Governor’s opposition to these measures. We therefore certified our own fiscal
plans for these entities.89 Even here, a large majority of the provisions in the fiscal

86 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, New Fiscal Plan for Puerto
Rico: Restoring Growth and Prosperity 11 (May 30, 2018) (hereinafter, New Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico).
The fiscal plan also projects $8 billion in private insurance funds, for a total of $62 billion of disaster
relief. Id.
87 For discussion and one estimate of migration since the hurricanes, see Martin Echenique & Luis
Melgar, Mapping Puerto Rico’s Hurricane Migration with Mobile Phone Data, CITYLAB (May 11, 2018),
available at https://www.citylab.com/environment/2018/05/watch‐puerto‐ricos‐hurricane‐migration‐
via‐mobile‐phone‐data/559889/.
88 See, e.g., Scott Neuman, Puerto Rico’s Governor Announces Plan to Privatize Island’s Troubled
Electric Utility, NPR (Jan. 23, 2018), available at https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo‐
way/2018/01/23/579875991/puerto‐ricos‐governor‐announces‐plan‐to‐privatize‐island‐s‐troubled‐
electric‐uti.
89 We certified the Commonwealth, P.R.E.P.A. and P.R.A.S.A. fiscal plans on April 19, 2018, and the
GDB, the University of Puerto Rico, the Public Corporation for the Supervision and Insurance of Co‐
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plans came from the Governor’s fiscal plans. And the Governor has subsequently
agreed to pursue legislation implementing some of the key labor reforms—such
as a shift to at will employment—in return for our agreement to allow some of the
savings from the reform to be used for investment in the people of Puerto Rico.90
These reforms need to be enacted legislatively, a step that is still uncertain as of
this writing.
With the new fiscal plans in place, the next step will be proposing plans of
adjustment in the Title III cases. Mediation with creditors has been underway for
months under the guidance of a team of mediators led by Judge Barbara Houser.91
There also have been numerous litigated issues in the Title III cases. We are hope‐
ful we can propose plans of adjustment for the Commonwealth and P.R.E.P.A. by
early 2019, though we cannot yet tell if that is realistic.

III. H O W S H O U L D O U R D E C I S I O N M A K I N G B E A S S E S S E D ?
Our decision making thus far has managed to draw sharp criticism from both
the left and the right. Working my way from left to right, I will briefly comment
on some of the most frequent criticisms in the discussion that follows. I then will
consider how—in my view—the success or failure of the Board should be assessed.
Critics from the left have condemned the oversight board as a colonialist im‐
position on Puerto Rico, have described it as a collection agent for creditors and
have argued that the spending reductions and governmental reforms we have
called for will be catastrophic for the economy.
Although the “colonialist” label is politically freighted, the general point that
the oversight board has undemocratic qualities is hard to deny. We were not dem‐
ocratically elected and the authority we have been given temporarily reduces the
authority of Puerto Rico’s elected officials. Advocates of oversight boards argue
that this can be a virtue, so long as the board is temporary, since the board is not
subject to the same pressures as elected officials, such as the need to be responsive
to powerful interest groups. In Puerto Rico’s case, the temporary suspension of
fiscal self‐governance was imposed by Congress in return for very strong debt re‐
structuring powers that, absent P.R.O.M.E.S.A., Puerto Rico did not have access
to. But I acknowledge there is a cost to the imposition of an oversight board. My
hope is that our decisions will prove to be good ones and that the intrusion of the
Board will one day be viewed as having been beneficial.

operatives of Puerto Rico (COSSEC, by its Spanish acronym), and the Puerto Rico Highways & Trans‐
portation Authority plans on April 20, 2018. We certified a slightly revised fiscal plan for the Common‐
wealth on May 30, 2018. New Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico, supra note 86.
90 New Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico, supra note 86. Our economist calculates that the labor reforms,
if enacted will enhance Puerto Rico’s economy by nearly a percent (.80%) every year. Id. at 3.
91 Because the mediation is subject to strict confidentiality constraints, I have omitted discussion
of any details.
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The second complaint—that the corrective measures required by the fiscal
plan will prove too stringent92—also needs to be taken seriously.93 Our economist
and our other experts believe that the adjustments will not prove harmful. Based
on the best estimates we have of the many relevant variables, we believe that the
Puerto Rico economy will return to positive growth by 2022 if the fiscal plan is
fully implemented. But the fiscal plan is based on a series of judgment calls.94 We
cannot rule out the possibility that they will prove to be wrong. If the projections
do prove mistaken, however, or other important variables change, we can and will
amend the fiscal plan.
Given the $54.5 billion and possibly more of federal funds that will be coming
to the island, it may no longer seem necessary to require governmental reforms or
the other adjustments in the fiscal plan. These funds will indeed make an enor‐
mous difference, and Puerto Rico is likely to have a fiscal surplus for the next sev‐
eral years as a result of the fiscal stimulus they will produce. But the disaster funds
do not remove the need for reform. If the changes in the fiscal plan are not made,
Puerto Rico’s economy is likely to quickly revert to deficits again after the federal
funds run out—our economist predicts a return to deficits by fiscal year 2029. The
consequences of failing to restore fiscal balance are shown graphically in one of
the key exhibits in the new Commonwealth fiscal plan.95 Not only are the adjust‐
ments still necessary; we believe that now is the optimal time to make them, pre‐
cisely because the influx of federal funds will soften their impact.
ANNUAL GAP/SURPLUS BASED ON IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS

92 See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz & Martin Guzman, From Bad to Worse for Puerto Rico, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Feb. 28, 2017) (criticizing the projections used for the initial fiscal plan), https://www.pro‐
ject‐syndicate.org/commentary/puerto‐rico‐debt‐plan‐deep‐depression‐by‐joseph‐e‐‐stiglitz‐and‐
martin‐guzman‐2017‐02?barrier=accesspaylog.
93 It is important to note that, although our fiscal plans can be criticized, P.R.O.M.E.S.A. precludes
any legal challenge to a certified fiscal plan. Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Sta‐
bility Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2126(e) (2016).
94 We believe structural reforms will have a significant impact on growth. Others, such as Larry
Summers, are more skeptical.
95

New Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico, supra note 86.
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The one criticism made by some on the left that is altogether inaccurate is the
suggestion we are essentially collection agents for Puerto Rico’s creditors.96 In‐
deed, we are unaware of any creditor that agrees. Before P.R.O.M.E.S.A. was en‐
acted, Puerto Rico and its municipalities did not have any bankruptcy or bank‐
ruptcy‐like mechanism for restructuring any of their debt. Every state can author‐
ize one or more of its municipalities to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code; Puerto Rico cannot. Puerto Rico is defined as a state for the
purposes of every provision in the bankruptcy laws except the provision authoriz‐
ing municipalities to file for bankruptcy.97 Faced with this exclusion, Puerto Rico
enacted its own municipal restructuring law, the Recovery Act, in 2013. But the
Supreme Court struck down the Recovery Act in 2016.98 The Court held that, alt‐
hough Puerto Rico was not a state for the purposes of the provision authorizing
municipalities to file for bankruptcy, it was a state with respect to another provi‐
sion that forbids the states from enacting their own municipal bankruptcy laws.99
As a result, Puerto Rico did not have access to any restructuring mechanism.
P.R.O.M.E.S.A. filled this gap. With the enactment of Title VI and Title III,
Puerto Rico now has even more restructuring options than a state since these titles
apply to Puerto Rico itself as well as to municipal entities in Puerto Rico. The over‐
sight board is in the midst of using both of these tools to restructure the debt of
Puerto Rico and some of its municipal entities.
Creditors and critics from the right have criticized the oversight board from
the opposite direction of our liberal critics. They have insisted the adjustments in
the fiscal plans are not nearly stringent enough, Puerto Rico’s precise fiscal condi‐
tion remains too opaque, our projections are too pessimistic and the fiscal plans
imply too deep a restructuring of Puerto Rico’s debt.100
Start with claims the fiscal plan could—and should—have been far more ag‐
gressive. This seems unlikely. Achieving fiscal balance after years of deficit spend‐
ing required painful adjustments to every part of Puerto Rico’s budget. The fiscal
plan cut as much as we believed possible, to the point where our economist’s pro‐
jections suggested that further adjustments would be too much for Puerto Rico to
bear and would prove counterproductive because they would prevent Puerto Rico
from ending a decade of negative real growth, a failure that would prevent any
sustainable recovery.

96

One irony in this allegation is that many of Puerto Rico’s creditors are Puerto Ricans.

97 The provision defining Puerto Rico as a state for most purposes is 11 U.S.C. § 101(52). The defini‐
tion and its exclusion were added in 1984, with no explanation regarding why Puerto Rico was excluded
from Chapter 9.
98

Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax‐Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016)

99

The provision preventing states from enacting their own restructuring laws is 11 U.S.C. § 903.

100 In a May 15, 2018 letter to the oversight board, Assured Guaranty, a substantial Puerto Rico cred‐
itor, insisted, among other things, that “the Revised Fiscal Plan suffers from flawed methodologies and
assumptions that result in an artificially pessimistic projection of Puerto Rico’s future revenues, eco‐
nomic growth, and debt capacity.” Dominic J. Federico, President and Chief Executive Officer Assured
Guaranty, to Members of the Oversight Board (May 15, 2018), at 2‐3.
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With respect to contentions that our economic projections are too pessimis‐
tic, this is possible, just as we cannot rule out the possibility our projections are
too optimistic. The projections are complex, and some of the key variables are
highly uncertain. But we have developed the projections as carefully as possible;
we do not think they are too pessimistic.101
Concerns about the extent to which Puerto Rico’s debt will be restructured
are framed in terms both of objections to the determinations reflected in the fiscal
plan and as a claim that a significant debt restructuring is incompatible with re‐
storing market access as P.R.O.M.E.S.A. requires.102 If creditors are not paid nearly
all of what they are owed, the reasoning goes, investors will shun Puerto Rico,
making it impossible for Puerto Rico to “access” the markets. Those who make
this argument often consider only half of the equation, however. While future in‐
vestors are indeed likely to consider the magnitude of the restructuring, they also
will consider the health of Puerto Rico’s balance sheet. If Puerto Rico does not
restructure its debt sufficiently—and as a result is not fully on its way to fiscal
balance—future investors will be reluctant to lend to Puerto Rico. New creditors
and investors look at the balance sheet and want to see low debt. They do not give
brownie points for having high debt because old debt has not been restructured.
Indeed, one of the major reasons Puerto Rico has not had market access for the
past four years is that investors concluded its existing debt was unsustainable.
The financial distress that made P.R.O.M.E.S.A. necessary can only be re‐
versed if every constituency shares in the sacrifice. The cost of government in
Puerto Rico is unsustainable and so too is the amount of Puerto Rico’s debt. Both
need to be brought into balance.
What about the role of the Board? How should our decision making be as‐
sessed? In my view, there are two key criteria. The first is whether the oversight
board makes the hard decisions that are needed to help reverse Puerto Rico’s
downward spiral and put the economy in a position to grow. We are expected to
make unpopular decisions that elected officials cannot easily make.
P.R.O.M.E.S.A. gave us very powerful tools to help reverse Puerto Rico’s decline.
If we use them well, as we have tried to do, we will have fulfilled an important part
of the trust that was placed in us.
The other key factor is making sure that the sacrifice is distributed fairly. If
some constituencies were to bear much of the sacrifice and others bore little, the
perception of unfairness would seriously impede the recovery process. This also
means taking the human costs of every decision we make into account. Pensions
are an example. Because the Puerto Rico’s pension systems are almost completely
unfunded —a deficit of more than $50 billion— we believe that they must be re‐
formed and that there must be adjustments to the benefits. But we have carefully
structured the reforms so that those with the smallest pension benefits will not
101 As noted earlier, P.R.O.M.E.S.A. precludes challenges to the fiscal plan by withdrawing subject
matter jurisdiction from the district court. 48 U.S.C. § 2126(e).
102 Recall that P.R.O.M.E.S.A. requires the fiscal plans to “achieve fiscal responsibility and access to
the capital markets.” 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b).
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face any cuts at all. The adjustments will only affect those who are most able to
afford them. And the overall adjustment to pensions—ten percent—is smaller
than the adjustments in other areas, in important part because the benefits are so
essential to the livelihood of the beneficiaries, as well as to Puerto Rico’s economic
health.
If the oversight board makes the hard decisions that we need to make, and if
we ensure that the sacrifice is distributed fairly, I believe we will have succeeded
in our task. We may not ever be popular again, but we will have done our part in
the resurgence of Puerto Rico.

